The State of Utah v. Konai Bloomfield : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2002
The State of Utah v. Konai Bloomfield : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mark L. Shurtleff; attorney general; J. Frederick Voros; assistant attorney general; attorney for
appellee.
Ronald J. Yengich, Vanessa Ramos-Smith; Yengich, Rich and Xaiz; attorneys for appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Bloomfield, No. 20020249 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2002).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3753
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff? Appellee, 
vs. 
KONAIBLOOMFIELD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S OPENING 
BRIEF 
Case No. 20020249 CA 
Priority No. 2 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT AND CONVICTION FOR TWO 
COUNTS OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, 
IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
6-302 (2001), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE HOMER F. 
WILKINSON, JUDGE PRESIDING 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
J. FREDERICK VOROS, JR. 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South 
Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
RONALD J. YENGICH #3580 
VANESSA RAMOS-SMITH #7963 
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
175 East 400 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-0320 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
' ' \# 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
KONAIBLOOMFIELD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S OPENING 
BRIEF 
Cas^ No. 20020249 CA 
Priority No. 2 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT AND CONVICTION FOR TWO 
COUNTS OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, 
IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
6-302 (2001), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE HOMER F. 
WILKINSON, JUDGE PRESIDING 
RONALD J. YENGICH #3580 
VANESSA RAMOS-SMITH #7963 
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
175 East 400 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-0320 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
J. FREDERICK VOROS, JR. 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South 
Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
I hird Judicial District Court: 
JUDGE 
llii I loiioijbk/ IIII ii i in in II1 " ilkmsun, IIHIJLH hiMding; 
PAKiibS 
State of Utah, represented by Mark Kouris, Assistant Salt Lake District 
Attorney; 
K omlidd. dclcndimi, icprcsciiicd 1^ Douglas "Weaver; Attorney at 
Law, at trial. 
4 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF PARTIES IN THE COURT BELOW i 
CONTENTS OF ADDENDA iv 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES v 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 2 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 10 
ARGUMENT 12 
POINT L.THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL 
TO CONVICT APPELLANT OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY IN COUNT I, AS 
IT RELATED TO THE ALLEGED VICTIM, JOSE FARIAS 12 
A. Standard of Review 12 
B. Marshaling the Evidence 12 
C. Evidence was Insufficient 13 
POINT II: THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL 
TO CONVICT APPELLANT OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY IN COUNT II, AS 
IT RELATED TO THE ALLEGED VICTIM, GABRIEL CALVILLO 23 
A. Standard of Review 23 
B. Marshaling the Evidence 24 
C. Evidence was Insufficient 25 
-ii-
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN 
ADMITTING THE VIDEO TAPE OF THE INCIDENT ABSENT PROPER 
FOUNDATION 29 
A. Standard of Review in Plain Error Analysis 29 
B. Error 30 
C. Obviousness of Error to the Trial Court 32 
D. Harmfulness and Prejudice to Appellant 32 
POINT IV: APPELLANT RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL WHICH PREJUDICED HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE SIXTH 
AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 34 
A. Standard of Review 34 
B. Trial Counsel's Deficient Performance 34 
C The Error of Trial Counsel Prejudiced Appellant's Right to Effective 
Assistance of Counsel and a Fair Trial 35 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 36 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 36 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 37 
-iii-
CONTENTS OF ADDENDA 
I. JUDGMENT 
II. RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES & RULES 
III. NOTICE OF APPEAL 
-iv-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
PAGE 
CASES CITED: 
Crawford v. Commonwealth, 231 S.E.2d 309 (Va. 1977) 19 
Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 949 F.2d 677 (3rd Cir. 1991) 3, 30 
Olsen v. Samuel Mclntyre Investment Co., 
956 P.2d 257 (Utah 1998) 14 
People v. Hughes, 39 P. 492 (1895) 19, 28 
Smith v. State, 534 S.E.2d 903 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) 21 
State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 2, 3, 12, 24 
State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539 (Utah App. 1998) 22 
State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591 (Utah 1988) 20 
State v. Carson, 950 S.W.2d 951 (Tenn. 1997) 18 
State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 4, 34, 35 
State v. D.B., 925 P.2d 178 (Utah App. 1996) 15 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993) 30 
State v. Hollen, 1999 UT App 123, 982 P.2d 90 20 
State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, 989 P.2d 1065 12, 24 
State v. Hudson, 206 S.E.2d 415 (W. Va. 1974) 19 
State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985) 31 
State in re V.T., 2000 UT App 189, 5 P.3d 1234 17, 18, 26, 27 
State v. Kazda, 392 P.2d 486 (Utah 1964) 19, 28 
State v. Labrum, 959 P.2d 120 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 18, 27 
State v. Lawrence, 136 S.E.2d 595 (N.C. 1964) 19 
State v. Leleae, 993 P.2d 232 (Utah App. 1999) 22 
State v. McCullum, 656 P.2d 1064 (Wash. 1983) 3, 30 
State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75 (Utah 1981) 19, 28 
Sate v. Purcell, 711 P.2d 243 (Utah 1985) 31, 32 
State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976) 20, 29 
State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221 (Utah 1998) 3, 30 
State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, 992 P.2d 951 3, 29 
-v-
State v. Smith, 706 P.2d 1052 (Utah 1985) 18, 27 
State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329 (Utah 1991) 2, 3, 12, 24 
State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 18, 27 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984) 4, 34, 35 
Webb v. State, 732 P.2d 478 (Okla. App.), 
cert, denied, 482 U.S. 930 (1987) 15 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES: 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 33 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 33,36 
UTAH CONSTITUTION: 
Article 1, section 12 of the Utah Constitution 33 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED: 
§ 76-1-601 21,22 
§ 76-2-202 17, 26 
§ 76-6-301 13, 14, 15, 25 
§ 76-6-302 1, 13, 14, 25 
§ 78-2-2(4) 1 
UTAH RULES: 
Utah R. Evid. 901 31 
OTHER AUTHORITIES: 
Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999) 14 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 14 
-vi-
RONALD J. YENGICH #3580 
VANESSA M. RAMOS-SMITH #7963 
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
175 East 400 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-0320 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ) 
vs. ] 
KONAIBLOOMFIELD, ; 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
) APPELLANT'S OPENING 
> BRIEF 
) Case No. 20020249-CA 
1 Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction of Konai Bloomfield 
("Appellant") for two counts of Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree Felony, in violation of 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-302 (2001). See Addendum I. 
This Court obtains jurisdiction to hear this appeal of a criminal case pursuant 
to a transfer from the Utah Supreme Court, under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(4). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL TO 
CONVICT APPELLANT OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY IN COUNT I, AS IT 
RELATED TO THE ALLEGED VICTIM, JOSE FARIAS 
In a jury trial, the jury serves as the exclusive judge of both the credibility of 
witnesses and the weight to be given particular evidence. This court reverses a jury verdict 
only if, after viewing all the evidence and inferences therefrom in the light most favorable 
to that verdict, it finds the evidence "sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), 
citing State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332 (Utah 1991)(other citations omitted). 
II. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL TO 
CONVICT APPELLANT OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY IN COUNT II, AS IT 
RELATED TO THE ALLEGED VICTIM, GABRIEL CALVILLO 
In a jury trial, the jury serves as the exclusive judge of both the credibility of 
witnesses and the weight to be given particular evidence. This court reverses a jury verdict 
only if, after viewing all the evidence and inferences therefrom in the light most favorable 
to that verdict, it finds the evidence "sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
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the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), 
citing State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332 (Utah 1991)(other citations omitted). 
III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN ADMITTING THE VIDEO 
TAPE OF THE INCIDENT ABSENT PROPER FOUNDATION 
Because Appellant's trial counsel did not object to the introduction of the 
video tape, this Court may still consider such argument under the plain error analysis or to 
avoid manifest injustice. See State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, ^  30, 992 P.2d 951,961 (Utah 
1999); State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221 (Utah 1998)1. In order to demonstrate plain error, 
defendant must show: 1) error, 2) that the error should have been obvious to the trial court, 
and 3) that the error was harmful. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
IV. APPELLANT RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
WHICH PREJUDICED HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 
OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
A. Standard of Review 
1
 See also Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 949 F.2d 677 (3 rd Cir. 1991)(holding that 
in the absence of objection at trial relative to instructing the jury on the State's burden of 
disproving self-defense, such error was sufficiently obvious to permit the court on appeal 
to consider it); State v. McCullum, 656 P.2d 1064 (Wash. 1983)(holding that defense 
counsel's failure to offer burden of proof instruction regarding self-defense, nor his 
objection to this lack of instruction was still an issue entitled to be reviewed on appeal). 
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To prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, a defendant must show: "(1) that 
counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defendant." State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), citing Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following relevant constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are referred 
to in Appellant's Brief and are reproduced at Addendum II: Fifth Amendment and Sixth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, Article 1, section 12 of the Utah Constitution, 
Rule 901 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-601, § 76-2-202, § 
76-6-301, § 76-6-302, and § 78-2-2(4). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
An Information filed on or about March 14,2000, charged Appellant with two 
counts of Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony (R. 002). 
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B. Course of Proceedings 
Appellant proceeded to trial by jury before the Honorable Homer F. 
Wilkinson, on August 14, 2000 (R. 98). 
C Disposition in Trial Court 
Appellant was found guilty of two counts of Aggravated Robbery on August 
14, 2000 (R. 51-52)2. Appellant was sentenced on November 9, 2000, to five years to life 
in prison on each count, to run concurrently (R. 82-83). A Notice of Appeal was signed 
December 7,2000, and untimely filed December 12,2000. (R. 89). After full briefing in this 
Court, the Court sua sponte dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction based upon the 
untimely filing of the Notice of Appeal. Appellant then filed a petition for post-conviction 
relief, which was granted (R. 99). Appellant was re-sentenced nunc pro tunc on March 
15, 2002 (R.118) and a Notice of Appeal was again filed, in a timely manner on March 19, 
2002. (R. 120). 
2
 Counsel on appeal did not represent Appellant during the proceedings held in the 
trial court. 
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D. Statement of the Facts 
The incident for which Appellant was convicted involved an assault which 
took place in a restaurant called Betos. There were five individuals involved in the assault; 
Appellant, George Afu, ("George") and "Joe" (LNU), who all arrived together, and two 
victims, Jose Farias ("Farias") and Gabriel Calvillo ("Calvillo"). Farias did not testify at 
trial. Officer Jason Huggard ("Huggard") had responded to a silent alarm at Betos on the 
night of February 26, 2000 (R.98, p.53). There was a video of the incident recorded from 
security cameras in the restaurant (Exhibit 1) (R.98, p.60). 
The State admitted the video through testimony of Huggard who stated that 
it appeared to be the video from that night. He identified the different cameras in the 
restaurant and testified that blood observed in the video was consistent with where it was 
actually discovered in the restaurant (R.98, p.63,67). The video was admitted without 
objection (R.98, p.67). From viewing the video, Appellant enters the restaurant at 
approximately 2:23:30. See Exhibit 1. There is conversation between Appellant's group and 
the individuals seated in the restaurant from approximately 2:23:40 to 2:24:05. Id. Appellant 
is standing at the counter until approximately 2:25:00. Id. Rachel Redding ("Redding") was 
present with the two victims while at the restaurant. Redding and Farias refilled their drinks 
at 2:25:26. Id. The video depicts Appellant swinging and attempting to hit Farias at 2:26:00. 
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Id. Farias fell on the counter top at 2:26:03, and a fight ensued. Appellant pulled out Farias' 
eyebrow ring at 2:26:23. Id. At the same time, a separate fight was taking place with Calvillo 
and Joe (the other person from Appellant's group). After the fight, George looked through 
Calvillo5s pockets as they left, and Appellant appeared to be standing over Calvillo, 
watching George at 2:26:52. Id. 
When Huggard arrived on the scene, Farias was on the floor unconscious and 
Calvillo was seated in a booth holding his face (R.98, p.55). Huggard testified that Farias 
had numerous bruises, scrapes and contusions on his head and that those were the only 
injuries he observed (R.98, p.55). Exhibits 3 and 4 were introduced to depict Farias on the 
evening in question (R.98, p.61). From the video, Appellant was identified as the second 
person of the group of three who entered the restaurant (R.98, p.64). 
Redding testified that both Farias and Calvillo had been drinking earlier in the 
evening (R.98, p.72). Farias was fairly drunk that evening (R.98, p.88). Farias had an 
eyebrow ring and a tongue ring (R.98, p.72). When Appellant and the two other individuals 
entered the restaurant, there were initial discussions with Farias and Calvillo (R.98, p.75). 
One individual from Appellant's group shook hands with Farias and everything was okay 
when they parted company. Id. Redding volunteered to get Farias a refill on his drink and 
approached the counter with Farias (R.98, p.76-78). Redding saw Farias fall on the counter 
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after being hit by Appellant and also saw Calvillo getting hit in the face (R.98, p.78-79). 
Redding also testified that Appellant pulled out Farias' eyebrow ring and that someone went 
through his pockets (R.98, p.80-81). Appellant, George and Joe left the restaurant, and 
Redding tried to call the police (R.98, p.83-84). Redding stated that she could only recall 
one person going through Farias' pockets (R.98, p.89). The video indicates that George — 
not Appellant — appears to be going through Farias' pockets (Exh. I, at approx. 2:26:15). 
Huggard also testified that it did not appear that Appellant took anything from Farias' or 
Calvillo's pockets (R.98, p.70). 
Calvillo testified that Appellant and two others came into the restaurant and 
they said hello. Calvillo did not know any of them (R.98, p.97). Appellant, George and Joe 
were ordering at the counter, and Farias and Redding approached the register (R.98, p.98). 
One of the individuals came behind Cahillo and then he losl consciousness Id. Calvillo 
stated that Appellant was not the one who came up behind him (R.98, p. 106). Calvillo had 
a bridge which was knocked out, but had no permanent damage (R.98, p.99-100). He also 
received a broken nose and required some stitches (R.98, p.99-101). Calvillo's wallet was 
taken from his back pocket, which contained some money. Calvillo testified that he did not 
have any weapons (R.98, p. 105). 
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The state rested and Appellant then testified in his own behalf (R.98, p. 108). 
Appellant and his friend George and other person named Joe went to Betos to get something 
to eat (R.98, p. 110). Appellant noticed Farias staring at them and giving them dirty looks as 
if they didn't belong there (R.98, p.l 11-12). Appellant asked Farias what his problem was 
and Farias made a motion as if he was going for a gun (R.98, p. 112). Appellant then walked 
to the counter to order food. He noticed Farias standing on his blind side, and Appellant 
believed he was about to be assaulted (R.98, p. 113). Appellant had been blinded in his right 
eye, so when Farias approached, Appellant thought he was going to attack him, so he turned 
and threw a punch at Farias (R.98, p.l 14-15). Appellant and George both hit and kicked 
Farias (R.98, p.l 16). Appellant pulled out Farias' eyebrow ring and threw it at him (R.98, 
p. 126). After Appellant left Farias, Joe asked if Farias had a weapon. Appellant responded 
that he did not after he went back over to Farias and patted him down (R.98, p. 126). 
Appellant then left with George and Joe. Appellant never took any property from anyone 
and never touched Calvillo (R.98, p.l 17). Appellant did not see Joe leave his side to hit 
Calvillo when they first were ordering food at the counter (R. 98, p. 123). When all three left 
in the car after the incident, Appellant saw Joe throw a wallet out the window (R.98, p. 120). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant submits that there was insufficient evidence presented to warrant 
his conviction for Aggravated Robbery as it relates to both Farias and Calvillo. As it relates 
to Farias, there was no evidence of a taking, given that the eyebrow ring that was removed 
was left with Farias, therefore there was no permanent deprivation of the property. In 
addition, although another individual appeared to be going through Farias' pockets, there 
was no evidence to support the notion that Appellant aided in that effort to warrant a 
conviction as an accomplice, or to satisfy the element of intent to deprive the owner of any 
property. Finally, there was insufficient evidence presented that Farias suffered serious 
bodily injury, necessary to warrant a conviction for aggravated robbery. The officer testified 
that, upon his arrival, Farias was unconscious and had numerous scrapes and bruises, but 
offered no evidence of any permanent damage or protracted loss of any bodily function. 
As it relates to Calvillo, there was insufficient evidence to support Appellant's 
conviction for Aggravated Robbery under accomplice liability. The evidence demonstrated 
that Appellant never assaulted Calvillo, nor took anything from him. Appellant was merely 
present after Joe assaulted Calvillo, and watched as his wallet was taken from him. There 
was no evidence presented that Appellant assisted or encouraged this activity, and therefore 
no reasonable jury could have convicted Appellant under the accomplice liability theory. 
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The trial court committed plain error in admitting the surveillance video tape 
of the incident without sufficient foundation and testimony demonstrating that the events 
depicted on the tape accurately reflected what happened. The video was admitted through 
the police officer who responded to the scene after the fight was over. Therefore, he could 
not testify that the events prior to that time were accurately represented on the video, nor did 
he testify as to the standard operations of the video, and that it was properly functioning on 
the evening in question. The prejudice suffered by Appellant was his right to a fair trial and 
his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses given that one of the alleged victims, 
Farias, did not even testify at trial. 
Appellant's trial counsel also rendered ineffective assistance by not objecting 
to the trial court's admission of the video tape, absent sufficient foundation. The analogous 
argument under plain error also satisfies the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, in that 
Appellant was prejudiced by the admission given that it was the only evidence presented as 
to the alleged victim, Farias, and his right to confront and cross-examine Farias was violated. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL TO 
CONVICT APPELLANT OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY IN COUNT I, AS IT 
RELATED TO THE ALLEGED VICTIM, JOSE FARIAS 
A. Standard of Review 
In a jury trial, the jury serves as the exclusive judge of both the credibility of 
witnesses and the weight to be given particular evidence. This court reverses a jury verdict 
only if, after viewing all the evidence and inferences therefrom in the light most favorable 
to that verdict, it finds the evidence "sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), 
citing State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332 (Utah 1991)(other citations omitted). 
B. Marshaling the Evidence 
Appellant has the burden of marshaling the evidence in an insufficiency 
claim.3 As such, the facts set forth in the above Statement of Facts provide the testimony in 
3
 "It is well established that a defendant's burden on appeal when challenging the 
sufficiency of the evidence after a jury trial is to 'marshal the evidence in support of the 
verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light 
most favorable to the verdict.'" State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, ^  14, 989 P.2d 1065. 
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the light most favorable to the State. In summary, the following facts supported the jury's 
finding of guilt. Appellant and two others arrived at Betos restaurant. As Appellant was at 
the counter ordering food, Farias approached on his blind side and Appellant started hitting 
him. During the course of the fight, Appellant pulled out Farias' eyebrow ring and threw it 
at him. Farias received cuts, bruises and abrasions and was unconscious when the police first 
arrived on the scene. Farias did not testify at trial, but a video tape of the incident was 
recorded from the restaurant surveillance cameras. From the video, it appears that while 
Farias was on the ground, George looked through his pockets and Appellant admitted to 
patting him down for a weapon. 
C. Evidence was Insufficient 
The relevant elements of aggravated robbery in this instant case are set forth 
as follows: 
1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he . . . (b) causes serious bodily injury upon another. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1953, as amended). 
(1) A person commits robbery if: (a) the person unlawfully and 
intentionally takes or attempts to take personal property in the possession of 
another from his person, or immediate presence, against his will, by means of 
force or fear. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1953, as amended). 
1. Insufficient Evidence of a Taking Against the Will of Another 
The first level of analysis begins with whether there was sufficient evidence 
to support a conviction for a robbery, which is the taking of personal property of another, 
against his will, by force or fear. As it relates to Farias, the evidence of a taking or 
attempting taking was the issue of the eyebrow ring which was removed and left at the 
scene. The only testimony as to a taking was Redding's testimony that Appellant removed 
the eyebrow ring, but there was no testimony as to what happened to it from anyone other 
than Appellant. Appellant stated that he did not take it with him, but that he threw it back 
at Farias. Appellant submits that the evidence presented is not sufficient to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that there was a taking. 
To be guilty of aggravated robbery, a person must unlawfully and intentionally 
take property from the possession of another. The meaning of "take" is not defined by the 
statutory language of sections 76-6-301 or 76-6-302 so the Court will look to the plain 
language to interpret its meaning. See, e.g., Olsen v. SamuelMclntyre Investment Co., 956 
P.2d 257, 259 (Utah 1998). A criminal taking is "[t]he act of seizing an article, with or 
without removing it, but with an implicit transfer of possession or control." Black's Law 
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Dictionary (7th ed. 1999). Similarly, "take" means "1) to get into one's hands or into one's 
possession, power, or control by force or stratagem: as a: to seize or capture physically . . . 
6) to transfer into one's own keeping: enter into or arrange for possession, ownership, or 
use of." Webster's Third New International Dictionary. As interpreted in Utah, there "is 
no 'taking' from the immediate presence of another until the victim loses the ability to 
exercise control over the property." State v. D.5., 925 P.2d 178, 181 (Utah App. 1996), 
(citing Webb v. State, 732 P.2d 478, 479 (Okla. App.), cert, denied, 482 U.S. 930 (1987) 
(defining possession as "the ability to exercise one's power over the personal property")). 
Appellant submits that he did not take the eyebrow ring from Farias, as 
required by section 76-6-301. Rather, he used the ring as a weapon against Farias and 
essentially cause pain relative to an assault against him. The evidence never demonstrated 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant ever gained possession or control of the eyebrow 
ring with the purpose to deprive Farias of it. Accepting that Appellant's conduct could 
support a taking under the robbery statute, then every person, attacker or victim alike, who 
uses another person's property as a weapon against the person, will be equally guilty of 
robbery. This would mean that any person engaged in a fight or in self-defense, who 
temporarily grabs hold of his opponent's property to use as a weapon against the opponent, 
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even if the property never leaves the opponent's possession, would be guilty of robbery, 
which is clearly inconsistent with a common-sense interpretation of this statute. 
Assuming arguendo that this Court finds sufficient evidence of a taking, there 
was no evidence presented to support that it was against the will of Farias. Farias did not 
testify at trial, and there was no other evidence presented through other witnesses to support 
the element that a taking was without permission of the person or against his will. As such, 
the jury erred in finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was guilty of aggravated 
robbery. 
2. Insufficient Evidence of a Taking Under Accomplice Liability 
Further, the evidence presented at trial, from witnesses as well as the video, 
was that someone other than Appellant was going through Farias' pockets and that 
Appellant merely patted him down to make sure he did not have a weapon. This evidence 
similarly does not qualify as a taking for purposes of the robbery statute. Under accomplice 
liability, Appellant also submits that when another individual was going through Farias' 
pockets, that was a separate, independent act, for which accomplice liability cannot be 
sustained. The accomplice liability statute states: 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission 
of an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, 
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commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in 
conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for 
such conduct. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1953, as amended). No evidence was presented at trial that 
Appellant solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged or intentionally aided another to 
engage in a taking. In State in re V. T., 2000 UT App 189, 5 P.3d 1234, the Court of Appeals 
reversed defendant's conviction for theft of a camcorder based upon insufficient evidence 
under the accomplice liability theory. In V. J7., the evidence demonstrated that V.T. and two 
friends were at a relative's apartment. The relative discovered guns and a camcorder missing 
after the three left and called police. Id. at ^ 2-3. The police discovered the camcorder at a 
pawn shop, with a video inside which depicted V.T. and the two other individuals, where 
one individual was talking on the telephone discussing pawning the stolen camcorder. V.T. 
did not say anything on the video. Id. at \ 4-5. The court held that passive behaviors, such 
as mere presence, even a continuous presence, absent some affirmative act to instigate or 
incite the behavior was not enough to qualify as encouragement under the accomplice 
liability statute and reversed Appellant's conviction for theft. Id. at ^ 10, 16-17. 
The facts in the instant case do not support a finding beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Appellant encouraged, incited, aided or commanded the others in seeking to 
accomplish a taking of property of another. Under the rationale of accomplice liability, a 
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defendant "must knowingly, voluntarily, and with common intent unite with the principal 
offenders in the commission of the crime." State v. Carson, 950 S.W.2d 951, 954 (Tenn. 
1997). Compare the facts in the instant case to cases where this Court has held sufficient 
evidence for accomplice liability. In State v. Smith, 706 P.2d 1052 (Utah 1985), the 
defendant aided in the robbery by recruiting a co-defendant to assist, picking the house to 
rob, and providing and driving the getaway car. Id. In State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990), an aggravated robbery conviction was upheld under the accomplice liability 
theory based upon the fact that the defendant had solicited a co-defendant to steal the 
getaway car, and that he and the co-defendants sorted through the stolen jewelry at a friend's 
house. These two cases demonstrate the type of evidence and the quantum of evidence 
needed to satisfy an accomplice liability conviction. The facts presented in the instant case 
fall far short of such proof beyond a reasonable doubt of accomplice liability in the taking 
or attempting taking of property from Farias. 
What the evidence does suggest, is the presence of the "mere presence'5 
doctrine. Under this doctrine, the fact that a defendant is present during the commission of 
an offense, or even has prior knowledge of the offense, does not make him an accomplice 
when he neither advises, instigates, encourages or assists in perpetration of the crime. State 
v. Labrum, 959 P.2d 120,123 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); see also State in re V. T., supra (passive 
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behavior such as mere presence - even continuous presence - absent evidence that the 
defendant affirmatively did something to instigate, incite, embolden or help others commit 
a crime is not enough to qualify as "encouragement"). 
Consequently, the evidence was lacking to support accomplice liability for a 
taking and a reasonable jury could not have found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt 
sufficient to warrant the aggravated robbery conviction. 
3. Insufficient Evidence of Intent to Commit a Robbery 
To commit a robbery, the defendant must have intended to commit the crime 
of robbery. State v. Kazda, 392 P.2d 486, 488 (Utah 1964). The intent to commit robbery 
is the intent to permanently deprive the rightful owner of his property. State v. Potter, 627 
P.2d 75, 80-81 (Utah 1981) (concurring) (citing People v. Hughes, 39 P. 492 (1895)); see 
also Crawford v. Commonwealth, 231 S.E.2d 309, 310 (Va. 1977) (following the common 
law meaning of robbery which requires intent to steal); State v. Hudson, 206 S.E.2d 415 (W. 
Va. 1974) (following the common law meaning of robbery which requires intent to steal, 
which is the "intent to feloniously deprive the owner permanently of his property"); State 
v. Lawrence, 136 S.E.2d 595, 599-600 (N.C. 1964) (holding an essential element of 
common law robbery is a "taking with the felonious intent" to "deprive the owner of his 
property permanently"). Appellant submits that there was no evidence of his intent in this 
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regard presented at trial. Although another individual may have attempted to go through 
Farias' pockets in an effort to take something, that was not a natural and probable 
consequence of an assault, for which Appellant can be held responsible under accomplice 
liability. 
So important is the element of intent that a defendant may even be convicted 
of robbery for a botched robbery attempt if he had the intent to deprive the owner of his 
property. See, e.g., State v. Hollen, 1999 UT App 123, 982 P.2d 90 (holding a defendant 
who pointed a gun at an employee's face and instructed the employee to "get the money" 
could be convicted of aggravated robbery even though he became frightened and left 
without the money); State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591 (Utah 1988) (holding a defendant who 
"accosted the victim with a knife and club and demanded to know where she kept her silver 
and gold" could be convicted of aggravated robbery even though he did not take anything 
from the victim). 
The intent to deprive the owner of his property "can be inferred by defendant's 
conduct and the attendant circumstances testified to by the witnesses." State v. Romero, 554 
P.2d 216,218 (Utah 1976). However, no evidence in Appellant's case can be used to infer 
that he took hold of the eyebrow ring with intent to permanently deprive Farias of it. 
Defendant was fighting with Farias, who had a ring protruding from his eyebrow. When 
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fighting, body jewelry becomes a prime target because it is easily-reached, and can be used 
to inflict pain. When Appellant grabbed the eyebrow ring, he did not intend to permanently 
deprive the owner of it; he intended to inflict pain. This is evidenced by the fact that, after 
grabbing the ring, he immediately threw the ring back at Farias. See Smith v. State, 534 
S.E.2d 903 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)(defendanf s aggravated robbery conviction reversed where 
evidence demonstrated that defendant made a demand for money, but there was no evidence 
that he actually took money). 
Consequently, this evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the 
State, cannot support any intent by Appellant to permanently deprive the owner of any 
property beyond a reasonable doubt. 
4. Insufficient Evidence of Serious Bodily Injury 
The next level of analysis is whether there was sufficient evidence presented 
to warrant the conviction for an aggravated robbery, by causing serious bodily injury. The 
statute defines "serious bodily injury" as: 
bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent disfigurement, 
protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, 
or creates a substantial risk of death. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (1953, as amended). Serious bodily injury is "the most severe 
type of bodily injury in Utah's three-tiered scheme." State v. Leleae, 993 P.2d 232, 237 
(Utah App. 1999). It is "bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent 
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, 
or creates a substantial risk of death." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(10). Injury "not 
amounting to serious bodily injury" is substantial bodily injury and does not fall under the 
aggravated robbery statute. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(11). 
In State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539 (Utah App. 1998), the Court found an 
instruction pertaining to serious bodily injury was clearly proper for the jury because the 
"[t]estimony of'loss or impairment of function5 was clear and uncontradicted." Id. at 544. 
However, the Court found a serious bodily injury instruction more questionable, though 
ultimately still appropriate, when the evidence showed a "broken jaw that [was] wired shut 
for six weeks with resulting eating difficulties, weight loss, extraction and later replacement 
of a tooth, and continuing pain." Leleae, 993 P.2d at 238. 
The only evidence in Appellant's case as to bodily injury was offered by 
Huggard, who testified that Farias had scrapes and bruises, and was unconscious when he 
arrived. None of these injuries is likely to amount to serious permanent disfigurement, 
protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or substantial 
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risk of death. In addition, Farias himself did not testify at trial. Huggard's opinion as to 
what injuries Farias may have suffered is not sufficient to meet the definition of serious 
bodily injury. 
Appellant submits that, at most, the evidence satisfies proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the offense of Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony, was 
committed, and Appellant's conviction should be reduced accordingly.4 
POINT II 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL TO 
CONVICT APPELLANT OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY IN COUNT II, AS IT 
RELATED TO THE ALLEGED VICTIM, GABRIEL CALVILLO 
A. Standard of Review 
In a jury trial, the jury serves as the exclusive judge of both the credibility of 
witnesses and the weight to be given particular evidence. This court reverses a jury verdict 
only if, after viewing all the evidence and inferences therefrom in the light most favorable 
to that verdict, it finds the evidence "sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
4
 The trial court did instruct the jury as to the lesser offenses of assault causing 
substantial bodily injury and assault. See Jury Instruction Nos. 27 and 28 (R.38-39). 
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the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), 
citing State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332 (Utah 1991)(other citations omitted). 
B. Marshaling the Evidence 
Appellant has the burden of marshaling the evidence in an insufficiency 
claim.5 As such, the facts set forth in the above Statement of Facts provide the testimony in 
the light most favorable to the State. In summary, the following facts supported the jury's 
finding of guilt. As already set forth in Point I above, Appellant and two other entered Betos 
restaurant and became involved in a fight with Farias and Calvillo. However, Appellant and 
George were fighting with Farias, and Joe was fighting with Calvillo. There was no 
evidence presented at trial that Appellant ever assaulted or physically touched Calvillo in any 
way. The video of the incident in the restaurant reveals that Appellant's fight with Farias 
was taking place at the same time as Joe was fighting with Calvillo. When Joe left the 
restaurant, Appellant and George walked over to Calvillo, but George went through 
Calvillo's pockets and took his wallet. Appellant was merely watching as George took the 
5
 "It is well established that a defendant's burden on appeal when challenging the 
sufficiency of the evidence after a jury trial is to 'marshal the evidence in support of the 
verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light 
most favorable to the verdict.'" State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, f 14, 989 P.2d 1065. 
-24-
wallet. There was no testimony from any witness as to whether Appellant encouraged or 
aided in this activity. 
C. Evidence was Insufficient 
Again, the relevant elements of aggravated robbery in the instant case are set 
forth as follows: 
1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he . . . (b) causes serious bodily injury upon another. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1953, as amended). 
(1) A person commits robbery if: (a) the person unlawfully and 
intentionally takes or attempts to take personal property in the possession of 
another from his person, or immediate presence, against his will, by means of 
force or fear. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1953, as amended). 
1. Insufficient Evidence of Accomplice Liability for Robbery 
As to Calvillo, there is no dispute that the evidence presented at trial outlines 
that Appellant never physically touched Calvillo during the course of the fight at the 
restaurant. From the witness testimony as well as the video, Appellant was not part of the 
assault which took place against Calvillo, and Appellant testified that he was not aware that 
Joe was even fighting with Calvillo until it was all over. Furthermore, the video reveals that 
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Appellant was standing next to George as he went through Calvillo's pockets, but there is 
no evidence that Appellant offered any assistance or encouragement. The analysis of 
insufficient evidence with regard to Calvillo begins with whether the evidence supported 
a conviction for a robbery under accomplice liability. Appellant submits 1hat his mere 
presence as it relates to Calvillo, and the separate independent and unforeseeable act of 
another taking his wallet, do not meet the parameters necessary to hold Appellant liable as 
an accomplice. The accomplice liability statute states: 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission 
of an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, 
commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in 
conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for 
such conduct. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1953, as amended). No evidence was presented at trial that 
Appellant solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged or intentionally aided another to 
engage in a taking. As argued in Point I above, as it related to Farias, the same analysis in 
State in reV.T., supra, applies. The assault and robbery that took place against Calvillo, was 
in no way aided, encouraged or assisted by Appellant. Even assuming there was a joint 
agreement between the parties to assault Farias and Calvillo, the unforeseeable act of taking 
Calvillo's wallet was not part of that common scheme. There was no evidence presented at 
trial to indicate that the parties formed that plan or assisted each other in carrying it out. 
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As argued in Point II above, the facts in the instant case are insufficient to hold 
Appellant liable as an accomplice when compared to other cases where the appellate courts 
have found sufficient evidence for accomplice liability. In State v. Smith, 706 P.2d 1052 
(Utah 1985), the defendant aided in the robbery by recruiting a co-defendant to assist, 
picking the house to rob, and providing and driving the getaway car. Id. In State v. Webb, 
790 P.2d 65 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), an aggravated robbery conviction was upheld under the 
accomplice liability theory based upon the fact that the defendant had solicited a co-
defendant to steal the getaway car, and that he and the co-defendants sorted through the 
stolen jewelry at a friend's house. 
Again, the evidence as it relates to Calvillo suggests only that Appellant was 
present during the commission of the offense against him. Under the "mere presence" 
doctrine, liability cannot be maintained by Appellant on this count. Under the mere presence 
theory, the fact that a defendant is present during the commission of an offense, or even has 
prior knowledge of the offense, he is not an accomplice when he neither advises, instigates, 
encourages or assists in perpetration of the crime. State v. Labrum, 959 P.2d 120,123 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998); see also State in re V.T., supra (passive behavior such as mere presence -
even continuous presence - absent evidence that the defendant affirmatively did something 
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to instigate, incite, embolden or help others commit a crime is not enough to qualify as 
"encouragement"). 
There was no evidence presented that Appellant assaulted Calvillo in any way. 
Furthermore, as Appellant was leaving the restaurant, someone else searched Calvillo's 
pockets while Appellant looked on. This conduct squarely fits within the notion of mere 
presence or knowledge of an offense with nothing more. Consequently, the evidence failed 
to establish Appellant's responsibility under accomplice liability for an aggravated robbery, 
such that reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt. 
2. Insufficient Evidence of Intent to Commit a Robbery Under Accomplice 
Liability 
To be liable as an accomplice in the commission of the robbery, the defendant 
must have intended to commit the crime of robbery in the same vein as the principal. State 
v. Kazda, 392 P.2d 486, 488 (Utah 1964). The intent to commit robbery is the intent to 
permanently deprive the rightful owner of his property. State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 80-81 
(Utah 1981) (concurring) (citing People v. Hughes, 39 P. 492 (1895)). Although the 
evidence may have been sufficient to find that another had the intent to commit a robbery 
when taking Calvillo's wallet, Appellant submits that there was no evidence of his intent 
in this regard. Although another individual took property from Calvillo, again that was not 
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a natural and probable consequence of an assault, for which Appellant should be held 
responsible under accomplice liability. 
The intent to deprive the owner of his property "can be inferred by defendant's 
conduct and the attendant circumstances testified to by the witnesses." State v. Romero, 554 
P.2d 216,218 (Utah 1976). However, no evidence in Appellant's case can be used to infer 
that he aided, assisted or encouraged another with the same intent to take property from 
Calvillo. The facts presented in the instant case fall far short of such proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of accomplice liability in the taking of property from Calvillo. 
Consequently, this evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the 
State, cannot support any intent by Appellant to permanently deprive the owner of any 
property beyond a reasonable doubt. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN ADMITTING THE 
VIDEO TAPE OF THE INCIDENT ABSENT PROPER FOUNDATION 
A. Standard of Review in Plain Error Analysis 
Because Appellant's trial counsel did not object to the introduction of the 
video tape, this Court may still consider such argument under the plain error analysis or to 
avoid manifest injustice. See State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, % 30, 992 P.2d 951,961 (Utah 
-29-
1999); State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221 (Utah 1998)6. In order to demonstrate plain error, 
defendant must show: 1) error, 2) that the error should have been obvious to the trial court, 
and 3) that the error was harmful. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
B. Error 
Appellant submits that proper foundation was not laid to admit the video tape 
of the incident. There was no testimony either from the officer or the witness, Redding, that 
the events depicted were an accurate representation of the actual fight. Huggard could only 
testify that the blood which was left in the restaurant and the victims who were present when 
he arrived were accurately depicted from the video. Huggard was not present during the 
fight and could not testify that those events were accurately depicted, as required for a 
proper foundation. The video was admitted into evidence through Huggard. Redding merely 
testified to events as they happened while the video was playing, but never indicated that the 
video was an accurate depiction of those events. 
6
 See also Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 949 F.2d 677 (3rd Cir. 1991)(holding that 
in the absence of objection at trial relative to instructing the jury on the State's burden of 
disproving self-defense, such error was sufficiently obvious to permit the court on appeal 
to consider it); State v. McCullum, 656 P.2d 1064 (Wash. 1983)(holding that defense 
counsel's failure to offer burden of proof instruction regarding self-defense, nor his 
objection to this lack of instruction was still an issue entitled to be reviewed on appeal). 
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Rule 901 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states in relevant part that: "the 
requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is 
satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its 
proponent claims." Utah R. Evid. 901(a) (2001). In order to conform to this requirement, a 
witness must provide "testimony that a matter is what it is claimed to be" based upon 
personal knowledge. Utah R. Evid. 901 (b)( 1 )(2001). In order to authenticate or identify a 
photograph (or video in this case) to qualify under the appropriate foundation requirements, 
a competent witness with personal knowledge of the facts represented by the video must 
testify that it accurately reflects those facts. Sate v. Pur cell, 711 P.2d 243 (Utah 1985); see 
also State v. Hygh, 111 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985)(holding that photographic evidence 
illustrative of a witness's testimony only becomes admissible when the sponsoring witness 
can testify that it is a fair and accurate representation of the subject matter based on that 
witness's personal observation). 
Huggard did not have personal knowledge as to the facts represented on the 
video prior to his arrival at the scene; i.e., the fight which ensued prior to his arrival. As 
such, the proper foundation was not laid for the admissibility of the video. Similarly, 
although Redding testified as to certain events which occurred as the video was playing for 
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the jury, she never testified that what was depicted was an accurate representation of what 
actually took place in the restaurant, based upon her personal observations. 
C. Obviousness of Error to the Trial Court 
Because the Rules of Evidence specifically outline what constitutes proper 
foundation and authentication for photographic evidence, Huggard's complete absence of 
any personal knowledge to authenticate the acts depicted on the video should have been 
obvious to the trial court. Moreover, there was no testimony from any of the State's 
witnesses indicating that the acts depicted on the video tape were a fair and accurate 
representation of what was actually taking place at the time. Appellant submits that the 
complete lack of foundation or authentication for the video from any witness should have 
been obvious to the trial court sufficient to constitute plain error. 
D. Harmfulness and Prejudice to Appellant 
The plain error analysis as well as error claimed by improperly admitted 
evidence requires that Appellant demonstrate harmfulness or prejudice by the erroneous 
admission. In State v. Pur cell, 711 P.2d 243 (Utah 1985), this Court held that it would not 
reverse a trial court's ruling on admissibility of evidence absent a showing that the error 
affected a defendant's substantial rights. Appellant submits that the prejudice from the 
-32-
improper admission of the video is that fact that absent the video, there was no independent 
witness testimony to demonstrate the elements of the offense. The erroneous admission of 
the video tape also affected Appellant's substantial right to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses given that Farias did not testify at trial. Both the Utah Constitution and the United 
States Constitution provide that among the rights of an accused is the right to be confronted 
by the witnesses against him. See U.S. Const, amend. VI; Utah Const, art 1, sec. 12. The 
substantive evidence admitted at trial as to any alleged serious bodily injury or that any 
property was taken or attempted to be taken without consent as it related to Farias, was the 
video tape. 
As Appellant argues below, there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that Appellant took property without the consent of Farias, or inflicted 
serious bodily injury. As such, the video tape cannot demonstrate those elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt without some personal eyewitness testimony. Consequently, because the 
video was not admitted into evidence with the proper authentication and foundation, 
Appellant was prejudiced and he was denied his right to a fair trial and an opportunity to 
confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, pursuant to the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article 1, section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
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POINT IV 
APPELLANT RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
WHICH PREJUDICED HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 
OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
A. Standard of Review 
To prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, a defendant must show: "(1) that 
counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defendant.55 State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), citing Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). 
B. Trial Counsel }s Deficient Performance 
Appellant submits that trial counsel's failure to object to the admissibility of 
the video tape, "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness55 as guaranteed by his 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Classon, 935 P.2d at 532. Appellant's trial counsel failed 
to object to the State's admission of the video absent sufficient foundation. As argued in 
Point III, above, this error is especially harmful given the fact that Appellant was unable to 
cross-examine Farias as to what allegedly occurred from is perspective The Utah Supreme 
Court in Classon also stated that when defendants make such claims of ineffectiveness, they 
must overcome the presumption that "counsel's challenged action or omission was sound 
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trial strategy." Id Appellant submits that the presumption is overcome by the notion that 
there is no rational basis for which failure to object to the video's admission would be 
strategic. The admission of the video essentially provide evidence against Appellant as to 
Count I without ever having the alleged victim testify or be subject to cross-examination. 
C. The Error of Trial Counsel Prejudiced Appellant's Right to Effective 
Assistance of Counsel and a Fair Trial 
This Court has held that the Strickland standard does not end the analysis 
under and ineffective assistance claim, and that "the benchmark forjudging any claim of 
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning 
of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." 
State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Appellant submits that when 
considering that he was prevented from cross-examining a key witness for the State, the 
admission of the video tape clearly prejudiced his right to a fair trial, and his counsel's 
deficiency would have resulted in a different outcome. Absent the improper admission of 
the video, the jury had no evidence to consider as it related to Farias. 
Even though the court in Classon held that the Strickland test was not met, 
they further looked at the claimed errors in light the defendant's fundamental right to a fair 
proceeding. Classon, 935 P.2d at 533. As noted there, "the right to counsel plays a crucial 
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role in the adversarial system embodied in the Sixth Amendment, since access to counsel's 
skill and knowledge is necessary to accord defendants the 'ample opportunity to meet the 
case of the prosecution' to which they are entitled." Id. Consequently, the adversarial 
process was so undermined that the trial in the instant case cannot be relied upon as having 
produced a just result. Id. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests this Court reduce 
the conviction on Count I involving Farias to an aggravated assault and reverse his 
conviction as to Count II involving Calvillo; and/or grant him a new trial. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Counsel for Appellant requests oral argument in the above matter. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of May, 2002. 
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
By 
RONALD J. YENGICH 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby declare that I mailed/delivered two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Appellant's Opening Brief, postage prepaid, this day of May, 2002, to: 
J. Frederick Voros, Jr. 
Assistant Attorney General 
Criminal Appeals Division 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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ADDENDUM I 
JUDGMENT 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
KONAI BLOOMFIELD, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
RE-SENTENCING 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 001904749 FS 
Judge: ROGER A. LIVINGSTON 
Date: March 15, 2002 
PRESENT 
Clerk: christef 
Prosecutor: KELLY SHEFFIELD 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): BRADLEY RICH 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: July 28, 1975 
Video 
Tape Number: 0315 02 Tape Count: 9:48 
CHARGES 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/14/2000 {Guilty Plea} 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/14/2000 {Guilty Plea} 
HEARING 
Based upon the stipulation of the parties, the previous sentence 
is vacated. Defendant is sentenced nun pro tunc as follows: Count 
I, 5 to life. Count II, 5 to life. Count I to run concurrently 
with Count II with CTS from the date of original 
sentencing. 
Case No: 001904749 
Date: Mar 15, 2002 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Count I to run concurrently with Count II with CTS from date of 
original sentencing 11-9-00 and full restitution is ordered. 
Dated this /j£ day of 
ROdEfClA. Li 
Disttfiftct Co 
Paa? 2 ( l a s t ) 
ADDENDUM II 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS, STATUTES 
& RULES 
705 UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION Amend. XII 
AMENDMENT I 
[Religious and political freedom.] 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances. 
AMENDMENT II 
[Right to bear arms.] 
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a 
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall 
not be infringed. 
AMENDMENT III 
[Quartering soldiers.] 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house, 
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a 
manner to be prescribed by law. 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.} 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminalactions — Provisions concerning — Due pro-
cess of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a spe'edy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-
ted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have1 compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT VII 
[Trial by jury in civil cases.] 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy 
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise 
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according 
to the rules of the common law. 
AMENDMENT VIII 
[Bail — Punishment.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 
AMENDMENT IX 
[Rights retained b$ people.] 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall 
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the 
people. 
AMENDMENT X 
[Powers reserved to states or people.] 
The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to 
the States respectively, or to the people. 
AMENDMENT XI 
[Suits against states — Restriction of judicial power.] 
[The judicial power of the United States shall not be con-
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the tJnited States by Citizens of 
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. 
AMENDMENT XII 
[Election of President and Vice-President.] 
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote 
by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at 
least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with 
themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted 
for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as 
Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all per-
sons voted for as President, and of ,^ 11 persons voted for as 
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists 
they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of 
the Government of the United States, directed to the Presi-
dent of the Senate;—The President of the Senate shall, in the 
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all 
the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The 
persorj. having the greatest number of votes for President, 
shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the 
whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have 
such majority, then from the persons having the highest 
numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as 
President, the House of Representatives shall choose immedi-
ately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, 
the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from 
each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall 
consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, 
and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. 
And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a 
President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon 
them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the 
Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of the 
death or other constitutional disability of the President.—The 
person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, 
shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the 
whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a 
majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the 
Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the 
purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of 
vSenators, and a majority of the whole number shall be 
necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible 
to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-
President of the United States. 
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&c. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
ithout due process of law. 1896 
ec. 8. [Offenses bailable.] 
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bailable 
tcept: 
(a) persons charged with a capital offense when there is 
substantial evidence to support the charge; or 
(b) persons charged with a felony while on probation or 
parole, or while free on bail awaiting trial on a previous 
felony charge, when there is substantial evidence to 
support the new felony charge; or 
(c) persons charged with any other crime, designated 
by statute as one for which bail may be denied, if there is 
substantial evidence to support the charge and the court 
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person 
would constitute a substantial danger to any other person 
or to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of 
the court if released on bail. 
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal 
lly as prescribed by law. 1988 (2nd s.s.) 
ec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punish-
ments.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not 
3 imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be 
Lflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated 
ith unnecessary rigor. 1896 
ec. 10. [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain 
Lviolate. In capital cases the jury shall consist of twelve 
arsons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of 
3 fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature 
lall establish the number of jurors by statute, but in no event 
lall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal 
ises the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-
urths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases 
lall be waived unless demanded. 1996 
ec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
> him in his person, property or reputation, shall have 
jmedy by due course of law, which shall be administered 
ithout denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be 
arred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in 
lis State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is 
party. 1896 
ec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
ppear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the 
ature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
lereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
itnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
le attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a 
Deedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or 
istrict in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, 
ad the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any 
:cused person, before final judgment, be compelled to ad-
mce money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed, 
he accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
imself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her 
usband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
3 twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary 
camination, the function of that examination is limited to 
3termining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
rovided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall pre-
ude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute 
or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with 
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is 
allowed as defined by statute or rule. 1994 
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indictment — 
Grand jury.] 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indict-
ment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination 
and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be 
waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by 
indictment, with or without such examination and commit-
ment. The formation of the grand jury and the powers and 
duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 1947 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issu-
ance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to 
be seized. 1896 
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.] 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of 
speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the 
t ru th may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall 
appear to the jury tha t the matter charged as libelous is true, 
and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, 
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right 
to determine the law and the fact. 1896 
Sec. 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.] 
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in cases of 
absconding debtors. 1896 
Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or military, 
shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the 
right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time of war, may vote at their 
post of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations to be 
prescribed by law. 1896 
Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing 
contracts.] 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the 
obligation of contracts shall be passed. 1896 
Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.] 
Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war 
against it, or in adhering to its enemies or in giving them aid 
and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on 
the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act. 1896 
Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.] 
The military shall be in strict subordination to the civil 
power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be quartered in 
any house without the consent of the owner; nor in time of war 
except in a manner to be prescribed by law. 1896 
Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden.] 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within this State. 1896 
Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.] 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without just compensation. 1896 
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise, 
privilege or immunity. 1896 
895 UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule 1001 
the declarant as a witness, the party is entitled to examine the 
declarant on the statement as if under cross-examination. 
ARTICLE EX. AUTHENTICATION AND 
IDENTIFICATION 
Rule 901. Requirement of authentication or identifica-
tion. 
(a) General provision. The requirement of authentication or 
identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is 
satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the 
matter in question is what its proponent claims 
(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way 
of limitation, the following are examples of authentication or 
identification conforming with the requirements of this rule: 
(1) Testimony of witness with knowledge. Testimony that a 
matter is what it is claimed to be. 
(2) Nonexpert opinion on handwriting. Nonexpert opinion 
as to the genuineness of handwriting, based upon familiarity 
not acquired for purposes of the litigation. 
(3) Comparison by trier or expert witness. Comparison by 
the trier of fact or by expert witnesses with specimens which 
have been authenticated. 
(4) Distinctive characteristics and the like. Appearance, 
contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive 
characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances. 
(5) Voice identification. Identification of a voice, whether 
heard firsthand or through mechanical or electronic transmis-
sion or recording, by opinion based upon hearing the voice at 
any time under circumstances connecting it with the alleged 
speaker. 
(6) Telephone conversations. Telephone conversations, by 
evidence that a call was made to the number assigned at the 
time by the telephone company to a particular person or 
business, if (A) in the case of a person, circumstances, includ-
ing self-identification, show the person answering to be the 
one called, or (B) in the case of a business, the call was made 
to a place of business and the conversation related to business 
reasonably transacted over the telephone. 
(7) Public records or reports. Evidence that a writing autho-
rized by law to be recorded or filed and in fact recorded or filed 
in a public office, or a purported public record, report, state-
ment, or data compilation, in any form, is from the public office 
where items of this nature are kept. 
(8) Ancient documents or data compilation. Evidence that a 
document or data compilation, in any form, (A) is in such 
condition as to create no suspicion concerning its authenticity, 
(B) was in a place where it, if authentic, would likely be, and 
(C) has been in existence 20 years or more at the time it is 
offered. 
(9) Process or system. Evidence describing a process or 
system used to produce a result and showing that the process 
or system produces an accurate result. 
(10) Methods provided by statute or rule. Any method of 
authentication or identification provided by court rule or 
statute of this state. 
Rule 902. Self-authentication. 
Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent 
to admissibility is not required with respect to the following: 
(1) Domestic public documents under seal. A document 
bearing a seal purporting to be that of the United States, or of 
any state, district, commonwealth, territory, or insular posses-
sion thereof, or the Panama Canal Zone, or the Trust Territory 
of the Pacific Islands, or of a political subdivision, department, 
officer, or agency thereof, and a signature purporting to be an 
attestation or execution. 
(2) Domestic public documents not under seal. A document 
purporting to bear the signature in the official capacity of an 
officer or employee of any entity included in Paragraph (1) 
hereof, having no seal, if a public officer having a seal and 
having official duties in the district or political subdivision of 
the officer or employee certifies under seal that the signer has 
the official capacity and that the signature is genuine. 
(3) Foreign public documents. A document purporting to be 
executed or attested in an official capacity by a person autho-
rized by the laws of a foreign country to make the execution or 
attestation, and accompanied by a final certification as to the 
genuineness of the signature and official position (A) of the 
executing or attesting person, or (B) of any foreign official 
whose certificate of genuineness of signature and official 
position relates to the execution or attestation or is in a chain 
of certificates of genuineness of signature and official position 
relating to the execution or attestation. A final certification 
may be made by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul 
general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent of the United 
States, or a diplomatic or consular official of the foreign 
country assigned or accredited to the United States. If reason-
able opportunity has been given to all parties to investigate 
the authenticity and accuracy of official documents, the court 
may, for good cause shown^ order that they be treated as 
presumptively authentic without final certification or permit 
them to be evidenced by an attested summary with or without 
final certification. 
(4) Certified copies of public records. A copy of an official 
record or report or entry therein, or of a document authorized 
bylaw to be recorded or filed and actually recorded or filed in 
a public office, including data compilations in any form, 
certified as correct by the custodian or other person authorized 
to make the certification, by certificate complying with Para-
graph (1), (2), or (3> of this rule or complying with any law of 
the United States or of this state. 
(5) Official publications. Books, pamphlets, or other publi-
cations purporting to be issued by public authority. 
(6) Newspapers and periodicals. Printed materials purport-
ing to be newspapers or periodicals. 
(7) Trade inscriptions and the like Inscriptions, signs, tags, 
or labels purporting to have been affixed in the course of 
business and indicating ownership, control, or origin. 
(8) Acknowledged documents. Documents accompanied by a 
certificate of acknowledgment executed in the manner pro-
vided by law by a notary public or other officer authorized by 
law to-take acknowledgments. 
(9) Commercial paper and related documents. Commercial 
paper, signatures thereon, and documents relating thereto to 
the extent provided by general commercial law. 
(10) Methods provided by statute or rule. Any method of 
authentication or identification provided by court rule, stat-
ute, or as provided in the constitution of this state: 
Rule 903. Subscribing witness* testimony unnecessary. 
The testimony of a subscribing witness is not necessary to 
authenticate a writing unless required by the laws of the 
jurisdiction whose laws govern the validity of the writing. 
ARTICLE X. CONTENTS OF WRITINGS, 
RECORDINGS, AND 
PHOTOGRAPHS 
Rule 1001. Definitions. 
For purposes of this article the following definitions are 
applicable: 
(1) Writings and recordings. "Writings" and "recordings'' 
consist of letters, words, or numbers, or their equivalent, set 
down by handwriting, typewriting, printings photostating, 
[Previous Document in Book] [Next Document in Book] 
Utah Statutes 
76>-<l>-<601. Definitions. 
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title: 
(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech. 
(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue 
in a criminal action. 
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of 
physical condition. 
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission. 
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means: 
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and: 
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the 
victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death or serious 
bodily injury; or 
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other 
manner that he is in control of such an item. 
(6) "Offense" means a violation of any penal statute of this state. 
(7) "Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to 
act and the actor is capable of acting. 
(8) "Person" means an individual, public or private corporation, 
government, partnership, or unincorporated association. 
(9) "Possess" means to have physical possession of or to exercise 
dominion or control over tangible property. 
(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or 
causes serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of 
the function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk 
of death. 
(11) "Substantial bodily injury" means bodily injury,, not amounting to 
serious bodily injury, that creates or causes protracted physical pain, 
temporary disfigurement, or temporary loss or impairment of the function 
of any bodily member or organ. 
(12) "Writing" or "written" includes any handwriting, typewriting, 
printing, electronic storage or transmission, or any other method of 
recording information or fixing information in a form capable of being 
preserved. 
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Utah Statutes 
76>-<2>-<202. Criminal responsibility for direct commission of offense or for 
conduct of another. 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission 
of an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, 
commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in 
conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a 
party for such conduct. 
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Utah Statutes 
76>-<6>-<3Ql. Robbery. 
(1) A person commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take 
personal property in the possession of another from his person, or 
immediate presence, against his will, by means of force or fear; or 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of 
immediate force against another in the course of committing a theft. 
(2) An act shall be considered "in the course of committing a theft" 
if it occurs in an attempt to commit theft, commission of theft, or in 
the immediate flight after the attempt or commission. 
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
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Utah Statutes 
76>-<6>-<302. Aggravated robbery. 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be 
"in the course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to 
commit, during the commission of, or in the immediate flight after the 
attempt or commission of a robbery. 
[Previous Document in Bookl [Next Document in Book] 
Copyright © 2001 Lois law com, Inc. All Rights Reserved 
[Previous Document in Book] [Next Document in Book] 
Utah Statutes 
78>-<2>-<2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of 
state law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all 
extraordinary writs and authority to issue all writs and process 
necessary to carry into effect its orders, judgments, and decrees or in 
aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including 
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior 
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings 
originating with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; 
(v) the state engineer; or 
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources 
reviewing actions of the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (3)(e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a 
statute of the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face 
under the Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge 
of a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction or charge 
of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which 
the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and 
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees 
ruling on legislative subpoenas. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate 
jurisdiction, except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order 
of a court of record involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and 
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a 
petition for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals 
adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to 
it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 4 6b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency 
adjudicative proceedings. 
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ADDENDUM III 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
RONALD J. YENGICH (#3580) 
VANESSA M. RAMOS-SMITH (#7963) 
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ 
Attorneys for Defendant 
175 East 400 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-0320 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
KONAI BLOOMFIELD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No. 001904749 FS 
Judge Roger A. Livingston 
Notice is hereby given that Konai Bloomfield, Defendant/Appellant in this matter, 
hereby appeals to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah from the judgment and conviction 
entered against him on August 14, 2000, and from the sentence imposed by the Honorable Roger 
A. Livingston on March 15, 2002. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ft day of March, 2002. 
RONALD f YENGIC 
VANESSA M. RAMOS-SMITH 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby declare that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of 
Appeal, postage prepaid, this 1 | day of March, 2002, to the following: 
Salt Lake District Attorney's Office 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Kenneth A. Bronston 
Assistant Attorney General 
10 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Court Reporter of the 
Third Judicial District Court 
450 South State Street 
P.O. Box 1860 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court 
450 South State Street 
P.O. Box 140210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0210 
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